A market in which the owner of a durable good, X, contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied. Good X may be in one of three states: "health," "disease," or "failure." Only experts can determine whether X is healthy or diseased and perform treatment. The owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed. This creates an information-based demand for health insurance by risk-neutral consumers. Imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks, strategic procrastination, and long-term health maintenance agreements.
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY lowers the value of the firm's private information. Of course, it also forfeits the benefits of early detection.
Multiperiod contracts are considered in Section V. When the owner and a firm interact repeatedly, it is sometimes possible to support an equilibrium in which the firm provides fair insurance against disease and the owner does efficient maintenance. These long-term agreements are naturally interpreted as health maintenance or extended service plans. Even when efficient long-term contracts are not supportable in equilibrium, it may be possible to support health maintenance agreements that are more efficient than short-term contracts by implementing a checkup frequency that is higher than first-best. A brief conclusion is provided in Section VI, and the Appendix contains several proofs. Some straightforward proofs have been abbreviated or omitted to save space.
II. The Model and the First-Best Policy
Let X be a durable good subject to random failure. For instance, X might be the physical health of an individual, the brakes on an automobile, or the financial status of a household.6 Good X begins in a state of health 0. The amount of time spent in this state is governed by an exponential distribution with hazard rate K.7 When X leaves state 0, it enters the "disease" state, 1. The amount of time spent in this state is also exponentially distributed with hazard rate X.8 Finally, when X transits state 1, it enters a failure or death state, 2, where it remains forever.9 Good X can be treated for disease at cost C. Treatment immediately returns X from state 1 to state 0. The problem is that a diagnostic check costing D is necessary in order to ascertain whether X is healthy or diseased. It is assumed that a diagnostic check is required before treatment can be performed. In other words, it is not possible to forgo the payment of D and conduct "blind" treatment. Of course, C is paid only if the diagnostic check reveals X to be diseased.
If X fails, its owner suffers a terminal cost J, which includes any decrease in his utility from the loss of services provided by X. For 6 Grossman (1972) provides the first formal attempt to model the physical health of an individual as a capital good.
Here, "time" is a measure of usage that may be distinct from chronological age. For instance, if X is an automobile, then "time" corresponds to mileage. 8 Distinct hazard rates XI 0 X2 can be accommodated, but the algebra is substantially more complicated, and the results are unchanged.
9 The "two-horse-shay" stochastic process governing the health of X may be interpreted as sequential component failure. Components fail according to a Poisson process, with two failures corresponding to a system crash. See Gale and Rosenthal (1994) for a model with a similar information structure but a very different application.
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instance, j could be the costs incurred when a tooth is pulled, a car engine is replaced, or an individual declares personal bankruptcy. Finally, as long as X survives, the owner bears a flow cost of K per unit of time, which represents the effort he exerts in maintaining X. For instance, if X is physical health, K represents the cost per unit of time of following a proper diet and exercise regimen.
It is assumed that the owner is risk-neutral and that he discounts at rate r. His objective is to minimize the expected present value of all maintenance, diagnostic, treatment, and terminal costs. He accomplishes this by selecting the length of time between checkups (the checkup interval) T E [0, oo) and a service plan (K, C) E {(KL, CH), (KH, CL)}, where KL < KH and CL < CH. In other words, the owner may choose to exert either a low or a high level of effort in maintaining X. If he opts for low maintenance, then X will be more expensive to treat when it becomes diseased.
Before the owner's objective function can be expressed and the cost-minimizing policy characterized, a few definitions are needed. Let F(S) be the probability that X is diseased, given that it has not failed, where S is the amount of time since X was last known to be healthy, that is, since its last checkup or since the beginning of its life. Some straightforward computation reveals F(S) XS/(1 + XS). Let the probability that X fails by time S be denoted by G(S) 1 -(1 + XS)e-XS. Also, denote the hazard rate of failure at S by H(S) XF(S). That is, the instantaneous failure rate of X equals X, the hazard rate of moving from the disease to the death state, times F(S), the probability of being in the disease state. Finally, LetJ(T, K, C) denote the expected present value of all future costs when the owner adheres to a checkup interval of length T and a service plan (K, C). Then J(T, K, C) is defined by the following recursive equation: 
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Suppose that it is known that X is diseased. Then the left side of (2') gives the discounted expected cost of not obtaining treatment, and the right side gives the discounted expected cost of obtaining treatment now and never again. As the time since X was last known to be healthy, S, approaches infinity, the probability that X is diseased conditional on its survival F(S) goes to one. Expression (2') says, therefore, that treatment is cost effective "at infinity." Moreover, since the inequality is strict, there must be some finite T* at which checkups become cost effective. Since this paper is concerned with procurement of treatment under asymmetric information, it is assumed below that (2) holds, so that (3) defines the first-best checkup interval. It is also assumed that the first-best policy calls for high maintenance and low treatment costs. That is, J(TL, KH, CL) < J(TH, KL, CH), where TL is the optimal checkup interval under the service plan (KH, CL) and TH is optimal under (KL, CH)-
III. The Agency Environment and the Contracting Game
Now, suppose that it is not possible for the owner to conduct checkups or treatment himself. Instead, he must hire an expert (a firm) to perform these tasks on his behalf. Firms are risk-neutral expected profit maximizers and also discount at rate r. It is assumed that the owner cannot observe whether a firm performs a diagnostic check or treatment. Moreover, the outcome of a diagnostic check is "soft" information. In other words, a firm has no objective means for substantiating its claim of whether X is diseased. This might occur because either the owner does not possess the expertise needed to evaluate the relevant evidence or it might be possible for a firm to fabricate misleading evidence. It is also assumed that a diagnostic check reveals to the firm the owner's choice of service plan, (K, C), but that this information is too costly to verify to a court and, hence, cannot be contracted on directly. These informational assumptions give rise to four potential incentive problems on the part of a firm. (I) A firm might shirk on performance of a diagnostic check and declare X to be healthy. (IL) A firm might shirk on performance of a diagnostic check and declare X to be diseased, in which case it will also shirk if authorized to perform treatment.10 (III) A firm might faithfully perform a diagnostic check, learn that X is diseased, and then shirk if authorized to perform 6o JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY treatment. (IV) A firm might faithfully perform a diagnostic check, learn that X is healthy, and declare it to be diseased so that it might be authorized (and paid) to perform unnecessary treatment.
The first three of these incentive problems are situations of standard moral hazard. Since the owner and the firms are risk-neutral, it is possible to eliminate these three potential problems with conventional incentive compatible warranties. For instance, a firm might sell a warranty to the owner that commits the firm to make an indemnity payment of V if X fails before some specified time T." It is straightforward to show that V and T can be calibrated to eliminate incentive problem II and that this is sufficient for the elimination of incentive problems I and III as well. Moreover, as long as the warranty is priced at its expected value, it is individually rational for a firm to sell it and the owner to buy it.
The focus of this paper is incentive problem IV, which cannot be eliminated with a warranty. To see why, suppose that a firm declares X to be diseased. Also, suppose that it backs this claim by offering the following warranty contract. If the owner does not obtain treatment and X does not fail before some specified time T, then the firm will make a payment of W to the owner. There are two problems with this scheme. First, imagine that W and T are calibrated so that the firm makes an honest diagnosis if it expects the owner to buy the warranty. Then, if it declares X to be diseased, the owner's best response is to authorize treatment, and he will not buy the warranty. However, if the owner does not buy the warranty, then the firm's best response is to declare X to be diseased regardless of its true condition. So there exists no equilibrium in which firms are always honest, and the owner always obeys their recommendations.'2 Even if it is possible to approximate this outcome in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, there is another important problem. The owner can profit at the expense of the original firm by cheating on the terms of the warranty and secretly obtaining treatment from another firm. Unless this can be prevented, firms will be unwilling to warrant their diagnoses of disease. Throughout the remainder of the paper, therefore, it is assumed that incentive problems I-ILL are eliminated with warranties but problem IV is not. An important consequence of eliminating problems I-ILL is that a firm has no incentive except to be honest whenever it gives X a clean bill of health (whether or not it has per-1" Dybvig and Lutz (1993) call this common type of contract a "block" warranty because it provides constant coverage for an initial block of time. They show that such warranties often possess excellent incentive properties in situations in which the rate of product failure depends on both the quality choice of the manufacturer and the care taken by the consumer. 12 Pitchik and Schotter (1987) analyze a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a similar game.
ECONOMICS OF BREAKDOWNS 6i formed treatment). So it is assumed below that treatment is faithfully performed whenever it is needed and that a diagnosis of health is genuine. Suppose that the industry consists of N identical competitive firms with which the owner may do business. Let S denote the amount of time since X was last known to be healthy, and suppose for convenience that the firms as well as the owner observe S.'3 Given the discussion of the previous paragraph, S = 0 can occur in one of three ways: it is the beginning of X's life, X has just been diagnosed as healthy, or a firm has just claimed to have treated X for disease.
The timing is as follows. At S = 0, firms simultaneously choose their diagnostic and treatment price schedules WT(Q) and Pi(.), i= 1, . . . , N. Then, at some time of his choosing, S = T s oo, the owner pays WlQ(-) and obtains a checkup from one of the firms. The chosen firm submits a diagnosis Oi E {0, 1}. If it declares X to be healthy, Oi -0, then the current round of play ends and S = 0 again.'4 If it diagnoses X as diseased, O' = 1, then the firm offers to perform treatment at price PZ().
After receiving a diagnosis of disease, the owner may either authorize the current firm to perform treatment at the specified price or seek the services of another firm. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no search or transportation cost associated with obtaining a second opinion and that no time elapses between consecutive checkups. ante contracts are very natural types of agreements, they are seldom observed in practice. Car mechanics and other technicians almost always perform diagnostic checks before making binding treatment bids. Medical and dental services are most often provided under a multiperiod scheme involving either an ongoing relationship between the provider and patient or some more explicit type of arrangement. An important shortcoming of ex ante contracts that helps to explain their infrequent use is identified below. First, observe that a firm never possesses an incentive to diagnose X as healthy under an ex ante contract."5 So whenever the owner obtains a checkup, he knows that he will receive a diagnosis of disease, 01 = 1, and that it will be false with probability 1 -F(T). This would not present a problem if the owner could commit himself to following the first-best service plan (KH, CL).
Because the owner knows that he will always receive a diagnosis of disease, he places no value on checkups alone and will obtain one only when he intends to authorize treatment. Moreover, because of the warranties discussed in the previous section, the owner knows that if he authorizes treatment, X will be returned to him in state 0, whether or not it was in this state already. So he views the total price HZ(S) + Pi(S) of each firm as a price for spot insurance against the presence of disease. Since the firms are identical, an equilibrium in ex ante contracts requires the total price of each firm to be actuarially fair.'6 If the owner could commit to the first-best service plan, this would yield
[II(S) + PZ(S) = D + F(S)CL, i=1,.. .,N.
It is easy to verify that if this holds and the owner follows the first-best service plan, then he will choose the first-best checkup interval, TL*. Unfortunately, ex ante contracts will not implement the first-best policy because they give the owner an incentive to do only minimal maintenance. PROPOSITION 2. Under an equilibrium with ex ante contracts, the owner implements the inefficient service plan (KL, CH) and the corresponding checkup interval TH.
Under an ex ante contract, the owner pays the same price, P(T), for treatment regardless of which service plan he implements. So his 15 The contract space could be enriched to allow a firm to be rewarded for submitting a diagnosis of health, but since the reward would have to be at least as big as the rents the firm could get by recommending unnecessary treatment, paying an incentive compatible reward is economically equivalent to operating under ex ante contracts. 16 Strictly speaking, Bertrand competition requires only two of the firms to price at expected cost in equilibrium. The other N -2 firms may post higher total prices, although they will get no business. Without loss of generality, only symmetric pricing equilibria are considered here.
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only incentive is to choose the plan with the lower maintenance cost, (KL, CH). Of course, in equilibrium the firms will anticipate this moral hazard on the part of the owner and will price accordingly:
IH(S) + Pi(S) = D + F(S)CH.
The fact that ex ante contracts provide poor incentives for owners to perform maintenance is an important reason behind the infrequent use of this type of pricing mechanism.
The simplest way of eliminating the moral hazard and concomitant inefficiency under ex ante contracts is to let the treatment price depend directly on the service plan, Pi(S, K, C). Recall, however, the assumption made in Section III that contracting directly on the service plan is infeasible because of high verification costs. Another method for inducing the owner to select the efficient service plan is to use ex post contracts. Specifically, when S = 0, all firms i = 1, . . .,
N post three price schedules [HZ(S), PL(S), Pp(S)]. Then at some time T ' so of his choosing, the owner pays a firm IW(T) to perform a checkup. If the firm diagnoses X as diseased (as it always will in equilibrium), it offers to perform treatment at either the low price PL(T) or the high price P} (T), or it refuses to treat X at either price.
If the firm makes a treatment bid, the owner may either authorize treatment at the specified price or take his business elsewhere.
This type of arrangement, in which a firm commits to its treatment price only after performing a diagnostic check, is often used in industries such as car and equipment repair, pest control, and personal financial planning. Ex post contracts do provide incentives for the owner to do efficient maintenance, but the fact that a firm obtains private information about whether X is diseased before committing to its treatment price can sometimes lead to another problem. Specifically, the owner will attempt to reduce the payment of any information rents by adopting an inefficiently long checkup interval. Before this is demonstrated, it is necessary to derive the equilibrium price schedules under ex post contracts. 
Also, in equilibrium a firm that performs a checkup bids PL(T) on treatment if the owner followed (KH, CL) and P} (T) if he followed (KL, CH)-
Two aspects of this result deserve comment. First, the conclusion that firms offer free diagnostic services in equilibrium with ex post contracts is attractive. In fact, this occurs widely in industries that use ex post pricing arrangements: auto and equipment repair, pest control, personal financial planning, and so forth.
The second notable conclusion of proposition 3 is more subtle. First, it is easy to establish
T o <T X CM C D + F(T) CM, M E {L, H}.
This, along with (4), indicates that if the owner adopts a checkup interval T 2 Tm, he will get actuarially fair insurance against disease. In other words, a firm authorized to perform treatment makes an expected profit of zero in this case. If T < Tm, however, a firm authorized to perform treatment makes a positive expected information rent of
R(T) CM -[D + F(T)CM], M E {LH}.
Under an ex post contract, a firm cannot commit itself to treat X below cost because it learns whether treatment is really needed before deciding what and whether to bid. This creates a positive expected rent since X needs the recommended treatment only with probability F(T). The rent persists in spite of the competitive environment because it cannot be dissipated without charging negative diagnostic prices HZ(T) = -R(T). These prices are infeasible since they would create a money pump for the owner, who could get rich by procuring checkups and never authorizing treatment. These observations lead to the following result. When, on the other hand, TL* < TL, the first-best checkup interval gives positive expected information rents to a firm. The owner can (and will) reduce these rents by waiting until TL** > TL* to get a checkup. By delaying, the owner raises the probability that X needs the recommended treatment from F(TL*) to F(TL**), and this dilutes the value of the firm's private information. Casual empiricism suggests that procrastination by owners in obtaining checkups is very common. Proposition 4 indicates that procrastination by informationally disadvantaged owners may be privately rational.
Of course, waiting until TL** is socially inefficient because of the increased likelihood of failure over the interval (TL*, TL**). The deadweight loss due to procrastination is the differenceJ(TL**, KH, CL)-J(TL*, KH, CL) (see fig. 2 ).
Although ex post contracts sometimes lead to inefficiently long checkup intervals (especially when the treatment cost is large relative to the diagnostic cost), inequality (6) ensures that the efficiency loss from ex post contracts never exceeds that from ex ante contracts. This seems reasonable in light of the profusion of ex post pricing arrangements. The next section explores long-term contracts that are also widely used and tend to be efficient precisely when ex post contracts perform worst.
V. Long-Term Contracts
The last section focused on equilibria of the infinite horizon contracting game corresponding to repeatedly playing equilibria of the The reason for the failure of ex ante contracts in the last section was that there existed no way to penalize the owner for implementing the inefficient service plan. In a long-term relationship, however, a firm may be able to induce the owner to comply with the first-best plan by threatening to sever the relationship if he does not.18 Suppose that the firms in the industry offer two types of contracts, short-term ex post contracts and a long-run version of ex ante contracts. Under the long-term contract, the owner agrees to obtain checkups and treatment from the same firm in each round unless and until either he or the firm exercises an option to terminate the relationship. The long-term contract also specifies the length T of the checkup interval the owner must employ. The total price of a "visit" in any given round is stipulated to be service plan and X is diseased, the firm must perform treatment before it can terminate the contract."9 Finally, it is assumed that if a firm terminates a long-term contract with the owner, then no other firm offers him a new one.20 So the owner must procure checkups and treatment using short-term ex post contracts, following severance of a long-term relationship. Of course, this disciplines the owner only to the extent that he is harmed by short-term contracts. PROPOSITION 5. A long-term contract of the type described above can implement the first-best policy (TL*, KH The left side of (7) is the cost to the owner of having a long-term contract terminated because he has performed low maintenance. Specifically, X survives until the checkup date TL* with probability 1 -G(TL*), at which time the owner's malfeasance is detected and he is forced thereafter to procure checkups and treatment with shortterm contracts. The expressionJ(TiM*, KH, CL) -J(TL*, KH, CL) is the net cost to the owner of being forced to use short-term contracts rather than continuing with the long-term agreement. The right side of (7) is the benefit from following the inefficient service plan under a long-term contract. The integral accounts for the difference in the present value of the maintenance cost annuities if X fails before TL*, and the expression following the integral gives this difference if X survives to TL* times the probability, 1 -G(TL*), of survival.
Proposition 5 Suppose that equilibrium short-term contracts are not efficient. Then the first-order effects from shortening the checkup interval in a long-term contract are to raise the cost of termination to the owner and to lower the benefit from following the inefficient service plan. Intuitively, a shorter checkup interval means that the firm monitors the owner more closely, since the amount of time he can get away with following the inefficient service plan is diminished. Of course, as T is reduced from TL*,J(T, KH, CL) rises. So there is a limit to how short the checkup interval can be made before the threat of reverting to short-term contracts loses its punch.
The long-term contracts characterized here are just actuarially fair insurance policies. A contract under which the provider of treatment insures the health of X over an indefinite horizon is nothing more than a health maintenance agreement or extended service plan. The owner demands this insurance not because he is risk-averse, but because he avoids the information rents associated with short-term contracting.
Arrangements in the spirit of these long-term contracts are very common in markets for medical and dental services and are sometimes observed in the auto and large-appliance repair and pest control markets as well. These contracts may be explicit as in the case of health maintenance organizations or dental plans, or they may be based more on good faith and reputation, as is usually the case with family practice physicians and neighborhood garages.2' An important point, buried in propositions 5 and 6, is that both X and r must be sufficiently small to support this type of agreement. In situations in 21 Hubbard (1994) presents some very interesting preliminary empirical findings regarding California's vehicle inspection and maintenance program. For instance, he reports that the failure rate on "under-hood inspections" performed by independent stations (neighborhood garages) is nearly half the failure rate on inspections performed by branded stations, 9.9 percent vs. 18.6 percent. These rates may be compared with the 15 percent failure rate on vehicles checked at state-run roadside inspection sites. which mobility and failure rates are high, it will not be possible to sustain multiperiod equilibrium contracts.
Finally, the equilibria suggested in propositions 5 and 6 are only one type of potential equilibria in history-contingent agreements. The fact that this sort of contract is often observed justifies it as a candidate for study, but probably not as the definitive solution. For instance, there may be multiperiod equilibrium arrangements in which a firm gives honest diagnoses and the owner uses a weighted average of the firm's prior recommendations to decide whether to sever the relationship. While it seems likely that such an arrangement could be supported as an equilibrium, note that it must be Pareto inferior to the contract of proposition 5, because the owner will sever the relationship following a run of sufficiently bad luck.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides theoretical underpinnings for several prominent features observed in markets for diagnoses and treatment. For instance, the heavy reliance on ex post contracts, the prevalence of free diagnostic services, and consumer procrastination in obtaining checkups are all consistent with the model developed above. Another contribution of this paper is that it identifies an informational demand for insurance. This is most clear in the long-term health maintenance agreements discussed in Section V, where it is shown that provision of health insurance by a firm eliminates the incentive for it to recommend unnecessary treatment.
Regarding the efficiency of markets for diagnoses and treatment, the findings of this paper are cautiously optimistic. First of all, the common practice of ex post contracting may be fully efficient. Moreover, in cases in which ex post contracts are fairly inefficient, proposition 5 indicates that efficient long-term health maintenance agreements are likely to be supportable in equilibrium. Even when efficient long-term agreements cannot be supported, however, proposition 6 shows that shortening the interval between checkups may allow the support of long-term agreements that outperform the sequence of short-term contracts.
There are, of course, many methods and institutions for dealing with the informational problems associated with markets for diagnostic and treatment services. Several prominent alternatives not discussed in this paper are the use of second opinions, the specialization of firms into either diagnostic or treatment services, and the reliance on professional associations that police their members. Each of these alternatives is important in specific settings, and they were excluded from the analysis above purely for expositional reasons. Nevertheless, the extent to which the market-based contracts studied here can alone alleviate the predicament facing consumers of expert services is encouraging.
